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District Energy Development In Liberalised Markets: 
Situating UK Heat Network Development In Comparison 
With Dutch And Norwegian Case Studies. 
Abstract	  	  
Many national energy policies envisage residual and renewable heat sources with 
district heating as a component of sustainable energy systems. There is however 
limited empirical evidence about facilitation of development in the context of 
liberalised markets and diminished local government control over direct service 
provision. Recent attempts to stimulate district heating have had variable outcomes in 
different countries. Using five case studies, we ask why heat network development in 
the UK takes a relatively piecemeal and fragmented form in comparison with the 
Netherlands and Norway, countries whose heating sectors are comparable with the 
UK and where district heating provision is limited. We argue that energy market 
liberalisation has been enacted differentially, resulting in different political and 
economic governance structures: in comparison with the UK liberal market economy, 
the more coordinated market economies of Netherlands and Norway retain greater 
capacity for collaboration between energy utilities, localities and states, resulting in 
stronger foundations for district energy. Implications for UK governance are 
considered. 
Key Words: Urban, energy, market governance, sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
UK policy for development of low carbon and renewable energy has largely relied on 
a technology-driven, supply-side model of innovation (Steward, 2012). It is however 
increasingly recognised that transformation of energy systems also requires 
innovation in societal institutions and among energy users (Coutard and Rutherford, 
2010; Geels 2010; Mitchell, 2008). A key setting for such socio-technical innovation 
is likely to be the urban and regional scale, where economy, ecology and politics 
intersect in the intensive end-use of energy in public, commercial and domestic 
sectors (Hodson and Marvin, 2012; Monstadt, 2007).  
At urban scale, energy scenario analyses suggest that district heating (and cooling1) 
networks could solve the problem of sustainable heat (and cooling) supply to densely 
populated areas and hence could form important components of integrated low carbon 
energy systems. Heat networks exploit the synergies between electricity, heating and 
transport services to achieve higher efficiency and greater deployment of renewable 
resources (IEA 2014). Heat networks can use any locally available fuel, including  
heat recovered from primary sources which would otherwise be wasted, and which 
are difficult to use at individual building scale. Cogeneration of heat and electricity 
can reduce electricity network losses and defer, or reduce, costs of capacity upgrades 
in distribution networks (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). Heat networks can also contribute 
to system balancing by generating heat locally and by thermal storage of excess 
electricity generation, reducing the need for investment in fossil-fuel ‘stand by’ plant 
and reducing costs of transmission network reinforcement (Lehtonen and Nye 2009; 
UK Low Carbon Innovation Coordination Group, 2012). Securing the systemic 
benefits of sustainability and flexibility in integration of alternative heat sources, 
however, is dependent on use of integrated networks operating across urban areas, 
rather than fragmented or small scale developments  (IEA 2005).  
Establishing such district energy infrastructure can be understood as a form of socio-
technical innovation to assemble the long-term, stable coordination of 
interdependencies between heat suppliers, investors, network operators and heat users 
in a particular locality (Summerton, 1992). There is however limited knowledge about 
                                                
1 Here we focus on heating rather than cooling, networks, as this reflects the choices made in the cases 
examined. 
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the political and economic governance institutions most likely to facilitate such 
developments in liberalised energy markets, when provision has historically been 
limited. The development of extensive district energy systems in Denmark and 
Sweden occurred prior to energy liberalisation across Europe, and was planned and 
organised by local governments, mandated by states; local authorities exercised 
considerable control over the relationships between energy systems, infrastructure 
finance and heat use  (Rutherford 2008, Ericson 2009, Grohnheit and Gram 
Mortensen 2003). Municipal ownership of both electricity and district heating 
undertakings was the norm; municipal house building programmes created significant 
heat load to secure network efficiencies and the combined welfare, economic 
development and environmental protection responsibilities of local government 
created scope to cross-subsidise development with other municipal services.  
This paper contributes to evidence about heat network development in contemporary 
conditions characterised by liberalised energy markets and diminished local 
government control over direct service and welfare provision. This allows us to move 
beyond anachronistic accounts, which emphasise the difference between development 
in state-planned vs liberalised energy sectors.  Our principle focus is on the UK and 
our key question is why recent UK heat network developments remain small scale, 
fragmented and hence technically sub-optimal, in comparison with those in relatively 
similar European countries (Wiltshire, et al 2013). Hence we compare developments 
in the liberalised energy markets of the UK, Netherlands and Norway. These 
countries are selected on the following criteria: first none have a history of significant 
use of district heating (7% of heat demand in the Netherlands, 4% in Norway and 2% 
in the UK, Euroheat & Power 2011); second each has recently introduced energy and 
climate policies advocating their energy and carbon saving potential (Netherlands 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2011; Dutch Warmtewet (Heating Supply Act), 2014; 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2009; UK DECC 2013; Scottish 
Government 2014); third all were early in liberalisation of energy; fourth they display 
homogeneity in the energy source underpinning heating services (gas in the UK and 
Netherlands, electricity in Norway). The key difference between them however is that 
they appear to have differential capacities for new development of urban-scale heat 
networks, with Netherlands and Norway being more advanced than the UK. The 
comparison is expected to provide insight into the factors which differentiate between 
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them. Specifically we examine the conjecture that the contrasting political and 
economic institutions of liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 
2001) result in differential forms of energy market liberalisation, which are associated 
with different capacities for district heating (DH) development. The UK represents an 
example of a liberal market economy (LME) and the Netherlands and Norway are 
examples of coordinated market economies (CMEs).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we discuss the inter-
relations between the knowledge and resources needed for district energy 
development and the governance institutions which shape liberalised energy markets 
in these three European states. Second we introduce case studies of five district 
energy developments. Since our primary focus is on the UK, we examine three UK 
examples of small projects in Aberdeen, Birmingham and Woking and compare these 
with developments in Rotterdam, Netherlands and Bergen, Norway. Lastly we discuss 
findings and draw conclusions about lessons for the UK in implementation of policy 
for low carbon heat. 
2. Inter-Relations of District Energy and Political and Economic Governance in 
Liberalised Energy Markets 
Securing the sustainability benefits of district energy relies on establishing long-term 
interdependencies between locally-embedded actors and resources, and non-
embedded financial and technical expertise (Summerton, 1992). Project development 
hence entails coordination and translation between technical-economic logics of 
infrastructure cost and risk mitigation, and goals of durable social and environmental 
benefits in relation to multiple organisational interests. Relative to other energy 
networks, DH infrastructure has high sunk (fixed) costs, justified by the exploitation 
of low cost heat sources (low variable costs) over the long term (networks are 
expected to last for up to 50 years). Its economic viability is hence dependent on long-
term user commitments to take heat supply from the local monopoly network; 
potential for price competition operates between heat providers to the network at area, 
rather than building, level. Summerton (1992) emphasises these features in her 
characterisation of DH systems as “grid-based multi-organisations” (GBMOs) with 
multiple interdependencies between heat generators, network operator, users and 
investors. As noted above, where heat networks are a significant part of national 
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energy systems, local and regional governments have historically played a critical 
coordinating role in the assembly of local GBMOs. Under these conditions, and 
supported by national government policies and programmes, local authorities in 
several European countries planned for spatially optimised heat network development 
in coordination with other utility systems, managed risks associated with a monopoly 
heat supplier and represented long-term public interests (Ericson, 2009; Grohnheit 
and Gram Mortensen 2003; Rutherford 2008).  
The contemporary institutional framework for DH development is very different. 
European political decisions to liberalise energy provision have prioritised forms of 
market competition, which are regarded as securing short term cost efficiencies. 
Commercial goals are achieved by disaggregating transmission and distribution from 
generation and retail, and the introduction of competition in wholesale and retail 
markets (Mitchell, 2008); social obligations are limited and policies are oriented to 
profitable returns on private capital (Rutherford, 2008; Sundberg and Sjodin, 2003). 
Energy liberalisation is part of the broader shift ‘from government to governance’ 
observed in many countries whereby activities and responsibilities which were the 
preserve of governments have been increasingly contracted out to an array of public, 
private and civil society organisations. This shift is both multi-dimensional and 
differentially enacted across countries (Lange et al. 2013), but in relation to localised 
energy, it has been associated with decline in capacity to effect coordinated planning 
and increased fragmentation in services (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Rutherford 2008; 
Monstadt 2007).  
The differential scale of new DH developments in the Netherlands, Norway and UK 
however suggest that the political and economic institutions of energy market 
liberalisation vary between countries, resulting in different opportunities or patterns of 
support for localised low carbon infrastructure. Comparative studies of capitalism in 
affluent economies notably distinguish between ideal types of liberal and coordinated 
market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). These two models are characterised by 
contrasting institutional and cultural frameworks which condition the interactions 
between state, market and civil society organisations, resulting in enduring 
differences in levels of social protection, business strategies, forms of innovation, 
terms of access to finance and availability of collective goods. In LMEs, businesses 
(and UK local governments) are incentivised to coordinate activities via market 
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contracts, competition and price signals. In CMEs, there is greater dependence on 
strategic coordination and deliberative problem-solving via information sharing in 
non-market and cross-sectoral networks. Differences in political and economic 
institutions, enacted through formal organisations, build different strategic 
understandings, through repeated experience, about how interested parties will act in 
relation to changes in economic context. Although in reality there are considerable 
overlaps between practices in different capitalist economies, as well as competitive 
pressures towards institutional convergence, evidence suggests that the institutional 
distinctiveness of LMEs and CMEs has not disappeared: economic and political 
organisations in CMEs have adapted to market principles, while the legitimacy of 
stakeholder capitalism and shared economic citizenship has persisted (Ingham, 2011).    
In addition the political and economic institutions characteristic of CMEs are argued 
to result in greater capacity for sustainable energy development than those of LMEs, 
because they create the necessary social infrastructure for cross-sectoral planning and 
deliberative problem-solving which is discouraged on grounds of inefficiency in 
LMEs (Mikler and Harrison, 2012). We identify two features of CMEs as likely to be 
advantageous in relation to new district energy development in liberalised energy 
systems. First, the political and economic institutions of CMEs are more likely to 
enable inter-firm collaboration over long-term trust-based relationships than LMEs; 
notably CME governance institutions are more likely to promote information sharing 
and reputational monitoring and to discipline non-cooperation. Second, CME 
governance institutions are likely to have greater capacity to shape market formation 
to secure urban DH economies of scope and scale. DH systems have an intensive 
capital investment phase during the period of network construction. This creates risks 
of stranded assets if the capacity to bring new subscribers onto the system is uncertain. 
National and local governments have scope to shape this process through planning 
policies, heat network operator regulation and area-wide concessions. The extent to 
which such policies are adopted, and are regarded by firms as credibly robust, 
influences the willingness of companies to invest. Neo-corporatist practices, and 
decentralised policy-making allowing multiple points of access and veto, are more 
prevalent in CMEs than LMEs, and are associated with establishing the long-term 
credibility of coordinating policies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Survey data from 2,500 
local authorities in 14 OECD countries also suggest that equivalent contrasts in 
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capacities for cross-sector coordination operate at local scale (Navarro Yáñez et al., 
2008). In countries where local government has both a high degree of responsibility 
for service delivery and a high degree of financial autonomy, as in Northern European 
CMEs (Sellers and Kwak 2011), coordinated action is more common, and becomes 
increasingly common the more central government interacts with local decision 
making.  
These theoretical observations lead to expected differences between outcomes for 
district energy developments in Norway and the Netherlands, commonly categorised 
as CMEs, and the UK, as an archetypal LME. Norwegian local authorities work under 
state supervision of expenditure, and are governed by principles of economic 
redistribution, but they exercise considerable direct control over revenues and their 
autonomy is treated as critical to effectiveness (Sellers and Kwak, 2011). Local taxes 
account for 44% of income, with an additional 14% from fees, and they remain 
significant stakeholders in enterprises including energy (Norwegian Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Development, 2013). Although financial centralisation is 
strong in Netherlands’ government, municipalities own stakes in regional energy 
enterprises (OECD 2013), and local political leaders have considerable discretion 
over budget allocation and play prominent roles in state and European politics. In 
contrast UK local government is constrained by statutory duties prescribed by central 
governments, and is principally dependent on central government grant funding rather 
than local taxation (Sellers and Kwak 2011); moreover it has no direct mandate in 
relation to localised energy provision. It is expected therefore that multi-organisation 
collaboration for district energy will be more feasible, and the role of the state in 
forming local DH markets more supportive, in the Netherlands and Norway than the 
UK.  
3. Governance of Urban Energy Development in Europe: Netherlands, Norway and 
UK Case Studies 
Case study data are derived principally from 15 semi-structured interviews with 
project developers, local government and state policy documents, and framework 
contracts and evaluations. The analysis draws on a larger dataset of 114 semi-
structured interviews with district energy project teams, policy-makers, finance, legal 
and engineering experts and representatives of large scale utilities, as well as four one 
  9 
day workshops with UK local authorities active in district energy developments. 
Interviews typically lasted for around one and a half to two hours. These brief 
accounts of projects inevitably gloss over the nuances of the process, which in each 
case was marked by forms of dissent, uncertainty and changes of direction. 
a. District Energy in BERGEN, Norway: multi-level governance and joint 
ventures 
Bergen’s district heating network connects a waste incinerator 12km from the city to 
public, commercial and residential buildings, delivering over 200GWh heat per year. 
The initial construction phase of the 75km network commenced in 2000, with first 
heat supply three years later.  
The network origins lie in Norwegian regulations requiring a minimum 50% recovery 
of useable energy from waste incineration, effectively prohibiting electricity-only 
design and necessitating heat use. Bergen’s municipal waste company (BIR) was 
granted an operating licence in 1996, but exploration of industrial uses of the heat 
proved unsuccessful, and the company approached a Bergen electricity utility, BKK, 
to collaborate in DH development. BKK had expertise in energy retail, and hydraulic 
engineering. BKK also identified complementarity between DH and its core 
electricity network business, because supplying non-electric heating to new buildings 
would defer costs of electricity network reinforcement. A joint venture, BKK Varme, 
owns and operates the network; BKK exercises overall control through a 51% 
shareholding. 
The Norwegian DH licensing regime acted as a complementary enabling framework 
to energy from waste efficiency regulations. The 1990 Energy Act introduced 
licensing for DH systems over 10MW, requiring applicants to produce detailed 
development plans, including evidence of integrated social, economic and 
environmental advantages relative to other options, and of customer commitments to 
connect (Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2009). Customer 
protection is included in licence conditions, lending legitimacy to the technology by 
establishing service standards and requiring tariffs to be competitive with electric 
heating. In exchange, the licence holder is granted sole rights to heat supply in a 
specified area.  
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BKK Varme adopted several strategies to accelerate deployment of the network. 
Established social networks were used to identify likely customers and to coordinate 
with other infrastructure projects in Bergen. The technical consultants selected for 
example had established relationships with other infrastructure operators such as the 
sewage company. The main heat pipe was laid alongside a motorway under 
construction at the time, and BKK Varme subsequently initiated the Graveklubben, a 
joint initiative among subterranean infrastructure companies to share costs of opening 
streets. 
The local authority, Bergen Kommune, was not initially a direct participant in 
development, although it is a major shareholder in both BKK and BIR. From 2007 it 
adopted a more pro-active role, partly because of growing Norwegian political 
emphasis on climate protection which gave salience to pre-existing local policies, and 
partly because of the perceived local economic benefits of the rapid development of a 
large heat network. The Kommune collaborated with BKK Varme in subsequent 
development to identify long-term heat loads and sites for new energy centres, and 
has converted major municipal buildings to water-based heating.  
District heating thus emerged from the ‘problem’ created by state regulation of 
needing to use a large heat source; its solution required coordination between heat 
generator (BIR) and users. A state regime of DH licensing afforded the developer a 
degree of confidence in the long-term security of its heat market, and simultaneously 
protected user interests. Local government did not directly stimulate the project in its 
early phase, but subsequently engaged in supporting expansion. 
b. District Energy in ROTTERDAM, Netherlands: knowledge exchange 
to joint venture 
The Rotterdam Warmtebedrijf connects a large waste incinerator in Rotterdam 
Harbour with older and new DH networks in the city, via a 26km pipeline supplying a 
mix of public, commercial and domestic users. Heat delivery commenced in 2013 
with planned connection of the equivalent of 50,000 homes; longer range visions 
incorporate heat off-take from multiple industrial sites and interconnection with 
regional networks including Delft and the Hague. 
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As in Bergen, the origins of the Rotterdam initiative lie in business engagement with 
regulatory issues concerning waste heat. In the 1990s, harbour industries were 
collaborating in industrial ecology programmes, with the objective of reframing 
environmental damage as a joint problem over which industry could exert more 
influence, rather than as a site of antagonism between industry, regulators, regional 
and state government and environmental movements (Baas, 2008; Baas and Korevaar, 
2010). Plant managers shared data for feasibility studies for heat recovery and use, 
and plans coalesced around DH supply to Rotterdam city regeneration districts as 
more achievable than inter-industry heat supply.  
Rotterdam city municipality was not a central participant in the industrial ecology 
programme, but the harbour company is itself a municipal business. As climate 
politics gained prominence in the early 2000s, the Mayor of Rotterdam joined the C40 
Cities climate leadership group on the basis of a claim to environmental sustainability 
innovator status. The city’s political leaders adopted an active role in sustainability 
initiatives, including industrial heat recovery, in partnership with businesses. The 
consequences of municipal involvement are contested, with some claims that trust 
between industrial ecology programme participants was undermined, that there were 
political mistakes and that new market procurement procedures, requiring competitive 
tendering and contractualisation, slowed development (Visser, 2008). The 
municipality nevertheless played an increasingly important role in the initiative, 
through financial investment, risk underwriting and use of its powers to support 
development of heat markets which the Warmtebedrijf would supply. Notably the 
municipality granted concessions to heat distribution companies in identified zones, 
and adopted building control regulations supporting connection of new and 
refurbished buildings to the heat network. 
At this stage, the DH business case (PVW, 2005) was the product of a partnership 
between municipality, businesses, the harbour industry association and three energy 
utilities; these are transnational E.ON; Nuon, a former Dutch municipal enterprise in 
which Swedish state-owned Vattenfall has a controlling share, and Eneco, owned by a 
consortium of Dutch municipalities. Two setbacks had a significant impact. The 
initial business plan used heat recovery from a harbour oil refinery, but the refinery 
operator withdrew during the engineering design period amid contested accounts as to 
whether political or technical factors lay behind escalating estimates of the cost of 
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extracting surplus heat from the refinery. Refinery withdrawal undermined system 
economics, at a point when competitive tendering had already resulted in operating 
concessions to Nuon and Eneco for new heat distribution networks. Political divisions 
arose within the municipality over the differential risks of uncertain future costs 
versus loss of sunk investment. A new business model, developed over two years, 
resulted in considerable scaling up and reorganisation of roles. E.ON presented a new 
set of financial models for the initiative, based on a more sophisticated model of heat 
dispatch, and including connection of an existing heat distribution network which 
E.ON supplied. The original plan for public ownership and operation evolved into a 
disaggregated structure, designed to secure the joint venture with E.ON and to govern 
commercial arrangements for heat supply to E.ON’s existing networks. A publicly 
owned company proceeded to build the transmission network, but operation is 
managed as a joint venture with E.ON. Whereas the original proposal combined heat 
from the refinery with a waste incinerator, the new proposal rested solely on the latter. 
However, in 2009 when the incinerator was closed in response to national 
overcapacity. A second incinerator was identified as replacement, but the greater 
distance from heat demand increased costs. The financial powers of the municipality 
were crucial; its equity investment increased from €9m to €38m, and the commercial 
loans it underwrites increased from €58m to €150m (Warmtebedrijf, 2010). The 
project received a €27m grant from central government, calculated as equivalent to 
the avoided social costs of CO2 and NOx emissions. 
Several parallels between Rotterdam and Bergen are clear. In both cases the 
relationships between firms and regulators and regional business networks motivated 
and sustained coordination to explore DH as a solution to an environmental problem. 
The rising salience of climate politics stimulated direct municipal government 
engagement in the initiative. In contrast with Bergen, where the state licensed the heat 
network operator, the involvement of Rotterdam municipality appeared crucial in 
establishing the framework for user connection, and in ensuring financial stability. 
Survival of the initiative, following withdrawal of the refinery, depended on extended 
collaboration, particularly between E.ON and the municipality. 
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c. UK District Energy Projects 
ABERDEEN: a non-profit company for the benefit of citizens.  
Aberdeen Heat and Power (AHP) is a non-profit company established by Aberdeen 
city council in 2002. It has developed and operates three DH schemes serving 
buildings under council control, including 1500 flats in 24 multi-storey social housing 
blocks, a school and community facilities. Heat supply is from gas CHP (total 
capacity 2.6MWe) and back-up gas boilers to three small networks; combined 
network length is 14km. AHP origins are situated in 1990s fuel poverty campaigns, 
mediated via UK and devolved government policies. In response to the UK Home 
Energy Conservation Act 1995 (HECA), Aberdeen city council commissioned a 
technical appraisal of fuel poverty solutions for tenants in electrically-heated multi-
storey housing. Gas CHP/DH was identified as the most affordable way of achieving 
low ‘cost in use’ of heating, as well as meeting HECA energy-saving targets. The 
recommendation was highly contentious in council, and the capital cost of CHP/DH 
infrastructure was regarded as unviable in the absence of grant funding.  
In the first years of the 21st century, the increasing prominence of climate politics, 
combined with poor UK social housing standards, led to the Labour government 
establishing a short-lived (2002-2007) Community Energy Programme (CEP). The 
CEP offered grant finance of up to 40% of capital expenditure for carbon savings 
achieved from DH; this proved instrumental in mobilising Aberdeen political 
commitment. The feasibility work already completed enabled successful funding 
applications, despite short timescales. Council housing capital, and government-
imposed energy company obligations to invest in energy efficiency, provided the 
remaining funding. Somewhat unusually in the UK context, loans to AHP for initial 
construction were underwritten by the council. Council investment is however small 
scale, at a total of £3.78m, in comparison with Rotterdam’s investment of €38m and 
its underwriting of €150m of commercial loans. AHP aims to expand beyond public 
sector loads to commercial supply, and has established a commercial subsidiary, 
District Energy Aberdeen Ltd, in order to limit council liability for bad debt, and to 
ensure compliance with EU competitive procurement.  
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BIRMINGHAM:  risk aversion and economic regeneration via a private partner.  
Although anti-poverty campaigns were a factor in promotion of CHP/DH in 
Birmingham, eventual developments were configured around goals of city centre 
economic regeneration, and a politically-contested calculus of whole life costs of 
alternative options for energy provision. Court cases brought by tenant campaigners 
against the council in the 1980s had resulted in orders for improvements in energy 
performance of housing stock. City engineers advocated CHP/DH as a long-term 
solution for affordable warmth; a pilot project gained approval, resulting in a small 
system serving a leisure centre and three multi-storey housing blocks. Local acclaim 
for the heating created a degree of political legitimacy for subsequent action in the 
context of economic regeneration strategy, and UK government CEP funding again 
proved instrumental in council support. Direct investment was, however, regarded as 
an unacceptable risk to council finances, and in line with the UK market-
commissioning model of local government, Birmingham council opted for the 
commercial contract route to finance, development and operation of DH.  
The successful bidder, Utilicom2, established Birmingham District Energy Company 
(BDEC) as a wholly owned subsidiary in 2006, under a 25 year concession contract 
guaranteeing heat and power purchase by the council and other public and private 
sector customers. The local authority relied on Utilicom’s access to loan and equity 
finance for the majority of investment, as well as its experience of network 
development, operation and retail supply. It thus externalised the project risk, but 
ceded direct control over future development. BDEC has established three CHP/DH 
schemes (total CHP capacity 7.5MWe). In the first scheme BCC owns or has a 
significant ownership stake in most of the heat subscribers (council offices, 
convention centre, sports arena and a leisure and retail development area). Additional 
subscribers include a hotel built by BCC, but operated by an international company, 
and the local repertory theatre. The scheme was subsequently expanded to the city’s 
new public library and two BCC multi-storey housing blocks, the latter relying on 
further UK government grant finance. The second and third schemes supply a 
university, a children’s hospital, magistrates court and BCC buildings, and are close 
to a regeneration area which may provide future subscribers. 
                                                
2 Subsequently Cofely following takeover by GDF Suez 
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WOKING: environmental politics, executive leadership and local enterprise. 
Local environmental politics and chief executive commitment made Woking borough 
council (WBC) an early innovator in energy saving, commencing in 1992 with a 
£250,000 revolving fund for reducing energy use in council buildings. Success of the 
programme on environmental and financial criteria strengthened political legitimacy 
and the council sought to scale up to larger DH projects. WBC developed a business 
model combining local authority participation with commercial finance and expertise. 
Its first attempted partnership with a regional electricity company (London 
Electricity) in 1998 was abandoned when the latter was bought by a transnational 
utility. In 1999 WBC established a joint venture, Thameswey Energy Limited (TEL), 
with a Danish company, with CHP and DH developments again supported by CEP 
grants. Of the remaining finance, 80% was commercial debt, and WBC took a 19% 
equity stake (i.e. WBC contributed 3.8% of the non-grant finance).  
TEL developed a number of small systems for WBC services such as sheltered 
housing. The most significant initiative, Woking Central (CHP capacity 1.4MWe), is 
anchored by heat loads from council buildings and has been extended to several 
private sector residential and commercial subscribers. The scheme was sized to serve 
a county council housing development, which was subsequently cancelled, creating 
financial problems due to over-sizing of the energy centre. TEL has also developed a 
CHP/DH scheme in Milton Keynes (about 100km away) serving new development on 
land held by a state owned regeneration agency, which supports DH connection 
through planning requirements. 
WBC’s ambitions for DH have been scaled back following two significant events. 
First, legislative changes (in UK and Denmark) resulted in 2004 in WBC buying out 
its Danish partner. The company’s legal form, however, requires it to mobilise 
commercial finance, so in 2005 a 10% stake was sold back to the partner. TEL 
continues to use commercial debt for project finance, but long term debt finance is 
now provided by WBC, increasing the council’s exposure to the project costs and 
their representation in its financial accounts. Second, the recession has slowed 
development in Milton Keynes and hence delayed DH development. The initial 
6MWe energy centre was intended as the first phase of a 24MWe system, but the 
envisaged trajectory of heat loads has not been met. The under-utilisation of heat (in 
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common with the Woking Central initiative) has led to an underperformance of 
financial models with, for example, the anticipated first year of financial returns from 
the Milton Keynes project being extended from 2015 to 2020. Political and media 
pressure, in a context of austerity in public finances, has led WBC to cancel further 
expansion in Milton Keynes. 
d. Comparison of Fragmented Governance in UK District Energy 
Development with Coordinated Governance in Netherlands and Norway  
While the UK cases have different objectives and organisational structures, with 
different relationships between local government and commercial district energy 
specialists, they also exemplify general characteristics of UK DH development which 
contrast with the European cases. First both Rotterdam and Bergen heat networks 
have origins in state regulation of economic activities, such as waste incineration, 
which generate large quantities of surplus heat. In contrast, in UK cases the ‘problem’ 
was not framed by regulatory requirements, but by finding local solutions to varying 
economic, social and/or environmental issues which were amenable to translation 
through localised energy provision, albeit this proved politically contentious.  
Second in the UK cases DH is structured in relation to fixed and bounded heat user 
commitments, mainly local authority controlled, without significant mechanisms for 
market expansion; in both Bergen and Rotterdam, licensing and planning and 
regulatory measures supported heat market development, and large heat sources were 
correspondingly exploited under relatively open market-expansion models. The scale 
achieved in the UK is hence smaller. Integration of TEL’s investment in Milton 
Keynes with planning regulation requiring new developments to connect to DH is an 
exception, but this has stalled. In Bergen the Norwegian area-based licence system 
protected BKK Varme’s target market from competing DH, and legitimised the 
system among subscribers as certified at high standards of economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. Local government further supported market 
development by adopting directive planning policies and helping BKK Varme to plan 
strategically in relation to anticipated developments, facilitating speculative 
investment. In the Netherlands’ governance was framed as a joint responsibility of 
public authorities and industries, and underpinned by consumer protection legislation; 
Rotterdam municipality acted to secure the heat market by granting a series of 
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exclusive area-based DH concessions to utilities, and applying supportive building 
control policies. 
The contrast illustrates a wider point that the UK GBMOs incorporate a narrower set 
of organisational interests. UK DH projects relied on initiatives taken by local 
authorities. Private sector involvement was coordinated by contracts governed by 
price signals and did not extend to identifying wider business or market expansion 
opportunities. In Bergen and Rotterdam, local authorities joined an established 
collaborative initiative with multiple stakeholders. The utilities involved were able to 
conceive of DH as a joint solution to their specific problems: incinerator licence 
conditions and electricity network constraints in Bergen; regulation of surplus heat 
and sustainability of E.ON’s existing heat network in Rotterdam. In Bergen and 
Rotterdam, DH development was thus less directly dependent on the capacity of local 
government to mobilise political support and expertise, although local governments 
continued to play significant intermediary roles. The relative weakness of UK local 
government, and lack of direct mandate for district energy, constrained the political 
confidence to coordinate such developments and the scale of investment. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The case study comparison suggests that, despite the considerable socio-technical 
challenges of all of these district energy projects, multi-organisation collaboration to 
establish larger scale heat networks proved more feasible in the Netherlands and 
Norway than in the UK. Case study comparisons indicated two important aspects of 
political and economic institutions which underpinned progress in European cases, 
and which were largely absent in the UK: first state regulation to align business 
interests around utilisation of surplus heat; and second coordination mechanisms by 
which national and/or local governments can establish heat markets through area-
based concessions which sustain business confidence in opportunities for expansion, 
while protecting user interests in reliable service standards and fair prices. These 
differences can be understood in relation to contrasting institutions of coordinated and 
liberal market economies through which the same discourse of energy market 
liberalisation has been enacted. The distinction between LMEs and CMEs is drawn in 
relation to ideal types, with considerable similarities and competitive pressures 
towards institutional convergence in practice. Netherlands and Norway seem however 
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to have greater capacity for cross-sector strategic coordination and deliberative 
problem solving suited to establishing the mutual inter-dependencies of new heat 
network infrastructure.  
In the more liberalised market economy of the UK, coordination via market contracts, 
price signals and short-term, fluctuating support initiatives appears to have weakened 
capacity for development of larger scale systems, with scope for more significant long 
term cost and carbon savings. Constant change in grant schemes and tax initiatives 
has created uncertainty and perceived risk for both local government and the 
commercial sector. Programmes have had short timescales, including abrupt 
cancellation of the Community Energy Programme which supported our UK cases 
(Hawkey, 2012); technical definitions and programme rules for carbon saving have 
been repeatedly altered and weakened, as in the definition of the ‘zero carbon home’ 
(Zero Carbon Hub, 2011), and revisions to the English planning framework have 
undermined local government energy planning (Hawkey, 2013). Whereas private 
sector involvement in Bergen and Rotterdam district energy was stimulated by 
regulatory frameworks which situated disposal of surplus heat as a problem 
confronting commercial organisations, analogous regulatory structures are absent in 
the UK. Instead UK policy requires only voluntary appraisal of heat capture 
opportunities from large thermal-input plants (particularly thermal electricity 
generators) (Hawkey, forthcoming). Commercial and policy officer research 
participants also suggested that UK government lobbying was instrumental in 
weakening the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, resulting in replacement of 
mandatory surplus heat capture and use with a lesser requirement for business case 
analysis; this has reduced the estimated impact of the measure by 70% (Services of 
the European Commission, 2012). As Hall and Soskice (2001) suggest, the 
centralisation of power in the UK’s ‘Westminster model’ appears to undermine the 
establishment of policies supporting cross-sector coordination, as firms and local 
governments justifiably have limited confidence in the long-term stability of policies.  
Despite this context, the increasing prominence of climate politics and pressure of 
statutory climate change targets, combined with growing political salience of slow 
progress in decarbonisation of heat, suggest scope for policy innovation to address the 
weaknesses of current political and economic institutions for energy governance. 
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There is potential to build on the integrated disciplining and enabling regulatory 
practices for heat market development in the liberalised energy markets of 
Netherlands and Norway. There is renewed interest from UK central and devolved 
governments in evidence gathering to support low carbon district energy, and in 
developing local authority coordination capacity. UK heat policy (UK DECC, 2013) 
included measures for creation of a Heat Networks Delivery Unit, exploration of 
regulatory frameworks for heat, and potential for a recovered heat incentive. There is 
also tacit acknowledgement that heat network provision is necessarily regional and 
local, and the National Assembly of Wales and Scottish Government have plans for 
coordination of heat network development along distinct pathways. These steps 
suggest the embryonic forms for strategic action, as well as potential for diverging 
energy policy in devolved UK governments. In particular, Scottish regulations 
requiring new waste incineration plants to meet minimum energy efficiency standards 
could drive businesses to identify DH as a means of meeting their objectives, which 
could give momentum to complementary enabling measures for heat market 
development through planning and licensing, as in Netherlands and Norway. There is 
hence opportunity for systemic transformation of UK provision for sustainable urban 
heating, but there are significant questions about whether the necessary shift in the 
liberalised political and economic institutions of the UK can occur without sharp 
public objection to the long-term costs of current energy and climate change 
trajectories. 
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